Belmondo said: Six of the twenty six episodes deal with Japan and the Pacific, and I'm including the hour on Burma which was a Japanese war front. This seems right to me for the following reason - even though Pearl Harbor brought us into the war, Churchill and Roosevelt quickly agreed that Germany was the greater threat and that it must be given priority over defeating Japan.
Is this a reason to direct the film narrative in such a way? No doubt, it partly explains the popularity of the series in the US. I doubt any Russian approach would yield the same results, even though it was a major player in World War II and took on the heaviest toll in terms of overall losses in the war. Soviet Russia was also directly engaged with Japan long before the US entered the scene - militarily.
The filmmakers' approach, as the producer, Jeremy Isaacs points out in
The Making of segment of the box set, was to focus on 15 major military subjects but devote 12 segments on the social and political experience of the countries involved in the war. His initial concern, in fact, was to deliberately "leave out a great deal". Left out was any mention of Abyssinia, Syria, Dauchau, Yugoslavia, the fate of Europe's gypsies (millions of whom died in concentration camps), a close examination of Poland and particular regiments or divisions of either side. Hardly touched was the subject of the resistance in Europe, sea battles or night battles. There's no examination of the slow desegregation of the American Armed forces (or a close social/political examination of any inner-military operation). So the series has obvious omissions. But that doesn't prevent the narrative from being fascinating, nevertheless.
Another glaring omission is a crucual (to my mind) look at Hitler's particular psychology. I suppose no historical entertainment of this breadth could probe into the inner reaches of Hitler's mind, particularly his reasoning for marching headlong into Russia without any seeming realistic strategy for conquering the nation. Had he waited or abandoned altogether his march into Russia the war might have turned out very different, indeed. After watching the series, however, I'm still left with the question of why he made such a misguided attempt. As the
WAW points out, Hitler warns of this very danger in his own work,
Mein Kampf. Why did he insist on doing it? And why, when Moscow was directly in front of the German Eighth Army did he have them turn south to besiege Kiev?
Now, Soviet expert David M. Glantz says this:
"Hitler began to seek targets that were still within reach before winter came and that would convince the world that Germany was in fact victorious. He was particularly anxious to seize Soviet industry and crop lands, as well as to push the defenders beyond bomber range of the precious Romanian oil fields. He therefore continued to insist that taking Moscow was far less important than securing the industry of Leningrad and the industrial and agricultural heartland in the Ukraine."
This development is discussed in the film, but not as the reason for Hitler directing his forces south to Kiev (though some may call it's a logical deduction). I'm left with the general impression that Hitler was more of a capricious madman and delusional than thoughtful military strategist (he was certainly not a savvy one unless you consider outright lying a savvy approach).
There is no real attempt to make comprehensive the inner workings of Hitler, the man, which I think is fairly important. We become familiar with his political views, his ideological beliefs and his powerful, mesmerizing harangues against the Jews and
for the world domination of the Aryan race. But we're left, primarily, with this. When the subject of Ava Braun, his mistress, which he married at the eleventh hour, comes up it's more of a curiosity than anything else. And in the light of how Hitler and the atrocities for he was responsible are portrayed it seemed pointedly macabre. Smart as this series, however (after all, docs are still a dramatic form), I'm sure the effect is entirely intentional.