Psychoanalytic Film Criticism

[bamwc2]

Is there a single school of historical thought that is scientific by Popper's standards?

Scientific? No. But, almost no one subscribes to Popper's solution to the demarcation problem (the problem of what separates good science from pseudoscience) anymore. According to Popper it's falsifiability. A hypothesis is falsifiable if there is some conceivable set of circumstances that could show implications of the theory to be false. Marxism and psychoanalysis both failed because they had the ad hoc claim of false consciousness to always fall back on (the same reason why he'd be opposed to certain strands of radical feminism today). The general theory of relativity is the classic case (Popper's too) of a falsifiable theory since it make all sort of predictions, including the famous experiments about the curving of light during solar eclipses. While falsifiability is undoubtedly a virtue of good science there are too many counterexamples: cases where there are unfalsifiable scientific theories and cases where pseudosciences are falsifiable. The lesson to draw from this particular debate, I think, is that there is no simple demarcation between good & bad science. It's a complex issue that requires many intricacies to work out.

As far as history goes, just think about the idea of a "scientific" approach to history. To put it bluntly, there's a reason why history is grouped with the social sciences--psychology, economics, sociology, etc.-- and not the sciences--chemistry, physics, biology, etc. It's because the discipline does not operate in a scientific manner. A friend of mine, wrote on this topic here. The methodologies are just not the same. Nor do I think that would any historian that I know tell you that she is a scientist or that her discipline is scientific. If you think that it is scientific, then please explain to me the methodology. How will you frame hypotheses (easy) and test them under controlled and public settings (much, much harder)? I'm not saying that it's impossible. Jared Diamond and his followers have tried to do it, but I'm highly skeptical of the results.

To return to a prior point of conversation, my old friend Google has come through again. I see that there is a lot on Marxist historical predictions online. I'll compile them later, but first I have to go put my son down for a nap. Then my wife and I are going to take him to see the new Pixar film.

Also, I want to make clear that I'm not trying to belittle Marx. Out of all of the so-called economic-philosophers (Smith, Hayek, Friedman, etc.) he's the one that had the most true things to say (though Smith probably isn't too far behind). But the claim that he's figured out the mechanism that drives all human history and allows him to make specific claims about the future? That is what I call bunk.

[matrixschmatrix]

Oh, if your objection is just to the (admittedly common) Marxist allegation that Marxist history is scientific, and uniquely so, something that can fit in with the hard sciences- of course that's silly, a 'scientific' history of that kind would be Isaac Asimov's psychohistory, not 'a thing that exists in the real world.' I think the social sciences, or descriptive science in general really, are not inherently any less valuable than the hard sciences, but they're clearly not the same thing, and probably could not be unless humans were as numerous and predictable as hydrogen atoms.

[jsteffe]

I actually think that Robin Wood's work (mentioned earlier in this thread) provides an excellent example of this is practice, especially his attempts to synthesize Marxism and psychoanalysis. I also think his work gives a great justification for the use of these methods as well: in his mind (and mine as well), if you are a film critic who is a political radical, these methods can allow you to use your position in the university or whatever to make political arguments. Reading "Hollywood from Vietnam to Reagan" as an undergrad film lover committed to leftist politics was a revelation to me.

I too am a huge fan of Robin Wood! He does a great job of teasing out the nuances and contradictions of ideology in the films he writes about. He also writes in an appealing and accessible style. Hollywood From Vietnam to Reagan is classic work of film criticism, but on the whole he left us with an incredibly rich body of work.

[jwd5275]

Also, I want to make clear that I'm not trying to belittle Marx. Out of all of the so-called economic-philosophers (Smith, Hayek, Friedman, etc.) he's the one that had the most true things to say (though Smith probably isn't too far behind). But the claim that he's figured out the mechanism that drives all human history and allows him to make specific claims about the future? That is what I call bunk.

I doubt anyone would disagree with you on that. However you have used this as a defense for:

I don't understand why its desirable or even rational to interpret all media under the lens of a particular ideology whether it's psychoanalytic, Marxist, modernist, postmodernist, feminist, etc. If anything, I would say that this approach hinders film studies rather than helps it progress.

This is what I have issue with. Just because Karl Marx advocates a view of historical progress (something that many Marxists critics don't even stand by), that does not remove the utility of Marxist critique for film criticism. In fact many directors specifically have a Marxist class critique of society in mind when they are filming.

[knives]

Oh, if your objection is just to the (admittedly common) Marxist allegation that Marxist history is scientific, and uniquely so, something that can fit in with the hard sciences- of course that's silly, a 'scientific' history of that kind would be Isaac Asimov's psychohistory, not 'a thing that exists in the real world.' I think the social sciences, or descriptive science in general really, are not inherently any less valuable than the hard sciences, but they're clearly not the same thing, and probably could not be unless humans were as numerous and predictable as hydrogen atoms.

I agree with you fully, but in that case social science should be held to the same standard of logic as the hard sciences even if the provability is different. The scientific method is a wonderful and simple thing and if a philosophy can't be held to its basic parameters (something like objectivism I feel fails in all cases for example) than it should be treated with the seriousness we treat flat earthers.

[bamwc2]

I've seen the term "objectivism" bandied about a few times on this thread. I'm not sure if your using the word in the same way that I understand it. Would you please define it, Knives?

[knives]

It's an offshoot of Rand's 'theories' and self preservation or some other ridiculous term.

[matrixschmatrix]

I was using Objectivism with reference to the tenet that gives it its name, viz. that truth and reality are objective and can be objectively perceived, rather than being subjectively determined within one's own framework. I don't know that one can prove this belief not to be true, but maintaining it while maintaining intellectual consistency would require that one either that a.) one admit one's own perception of objective reality is flawed, which makes the whole line of argument more neo-Platonic (anathema to Rand) or b.) one retreat into solipsism, as everyone else's perception proves eventually different to one's own. So to me, Objectivism is as close to being provably wrong on its own terms as any that I can think of, offhand.

[knives]

Yeah, Matrix explains it reasonably though in general I'd push for the separate elements of the philosophy being tested as functional within their own logic. In this sense I've also, just to give an example, found Hegel's dialectic to be unscientific due to its static perception of the world with a Bergsonian conception of duration necessary to make it a functioning theory.

[Mr Sausage]

I was using Objectivism with reference to the tenet that gives it its name, viz. that truth and reality are objective and can be objectively perceived, rather than being subjectively determined within one's own framework. I don't know that one can prove this belief not to be true, but maintaining it while maintaining intellectual consistency would require that one either that a.) one admit one's own perception of objective reality is flawed, which makes the whole line of argument more neo-Platonic (anathema to Rand) or b.) one retreat into solipsism, as everyone else's perception proves eventually different to one's own. So to me, Objectivism is as close to being provably wrong on its own terms as any that I can think of, offhand.

In this case the correct term, I believe, is realism (or philosophic realism to distinguish it from artistic schools called realist). And I don't think the only two possibilities are:
A. admit one's perception of reality is flawed.
B. retreat into solipsism.

Realist philosophers believe that a close, well-trained observation of things brings the mind closer to objective reality (and I suppose with the assumption that objective truth is knowable). They are not defeatist in the way A. implies.

There are other contrasts to realism besides solipsism: mainly, Idealism, which you get from Kant, Berkeley, Hegel, ect., none of whom were technically solipsists.

I'm sure bamwc2 would be able to explain this in more detail.

[knives]

There's a difference between realist philosophy (as far as I understand your usage) and an objectivist one where. With realist the goal is to be as reasonable and objective as possible utilizing the tools available. It allows for more complexity than a simple I think therefore I am situation. Objectivists pervert that a little to say that the objective way of thinking is essentially in following through on base instincts of self interest.

[Mr Sausage]

Yeah, I was for sure not talking about the Ayn Randian philosophy if Objectivism, which I gathered matrixschmatrix wasn't talking about, either, but was confusingly appropriating its name.

[knives]

Gotcha, that makes a bit more sense.

[matrixschmatrix]

Oh, I was talking about Rand- she may have been appropriating other philosophical ideas, but her Objectivism did refer to the tenet I mentioned earlier. Obviously, there are other problematic aspects of her philosophy as well, but her whole 'A=A' thing was an attempt to express that things are concrete and knowable in an objective reality. She also believed that her own perception of reality was objectively correct. As such, at each point of disagreement, the two possibilities I outlined became more closely the only remaining possibilities.

I don't really think I believe in an objective reality in the first place- there may be aspects of the shared reality, the overlap in the koinos kosmos of each individual viewer, which may be universal enough to be accepted as objectively true, but I don't see why we should assume that to be absolute truth rather than relative to the human condition or whatever. That said, I'm not automatically going to discredit any philosophy that believes there exists an absolute truth, merely any in which a dogmatic central figure presumes that he or she has an absolutely correct perception of it. Accepting that one's perception is affected by one's viewpoint and circumstances need not be a defeat, but it is if one is Ayn Rand.

[Mr Sausage]

I don't understand. In what way can you be talking specifically about Rand if you admit you're talking about ideas that aren't specific to her philosophy? I'm pretty sure objectivist metaphysics are a little more specific than just a realist proposition that certain things exist independent of the mind and that humans can apprehend those things.

[bamwc2]

I just got back and will write more on this later, but the any poster that accuses me of being a follower of Rand's will get punched through an internet tube.

[bamwc2]

Okay. So, like I said last night, there are plenty of predictions that Marx drew from his view of history that have failed to pan out, including the lifespan of capitalism, the industrial states that would fall, etc (since these are easily Googleable, I won't collect them here). That is not to say that his critiques of the exploitation of the worker or his argument in favor of the need for some form of economic planning aren't correct. Instead, I think that the problem lies in his doctrinaire commitment to Hegelianism (at university, he was a member of a group called "The Young Hegelians"--Nerd!). Trying to shoehorn all experience and human occurrences into the model of dialectical materialism simply doesn't work--a critique that I think is true of any -ism that provides us with a lens through which we attempt to filter all reality. Inevitably somethings will be left out and other radically distorted.

As for the philosophical terminology, I would strongly recommend turning to The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy if you ever have any questions about philosophical meanings. Barring that, even Wikipedia (something that I never thought I would recommend a few years back) now does a fairly decent job accurately explaining the basics of the concepts. Within the literature "realism" and "objectivism" are often used interchangeably, but can mean different things based upon the sub-discipline. Hence, realism in metaphysics might denote the belief that universals, propositions, or possible worlds exist, while in ethics it might mean that there are objective moral properties in the world. Even here we find a confusion because there are different types of realism. For example, a strong realist in ethics might hold that moral properties are part of the universe, while a soft realist (my own position) hold that there are universal moral truths that inevitably arise out of specific (though contingent) facts about humanity. Like all philosophical jargon, these terms are loose, and can be applied in different ways. That's one of the reasons why I vastly prefer it when authors give at least a sentence explaining what they mean by a term.

Do not conflate realism/objectivism in the above sense with Randian objectivism. Yes, she did use the term to denote at least in part the belief that there is an objective morality (I agree) and a mind-independent reality (yep), but there's so much more that goes along with her stance including the moral superiority of selfishness and the efficacy of unregulated markets (both big 'no's in my book). Even if we ignore the fact that she was arguably wrong about far, far more than she was right, there's the glaring fact that she wasn't even a philosopher in the same way that religious figures aren't philosophers. She didn't really offer arguments for her positions. There were loosely connected statements that could be strung together to charitably imply an argument, but most of her writing is speed-fueled assertions that are supposed to be unquestionable facts. If you even suggested that hypothetically she could be wrong, you were out of the objectivist club. In this way she was more of a cult leader than a philosopher (Plus she really didn't even understand previous philosophers. Her interpretation of Kant--humanity's greatest villain in her book because of his anti-realism--is so far off the mark its laughable).

P.S. Monsters University is Pixar's best film since Up.

[jwd5275]

Once again I wouldn't disagree with this, but how does any of this go towards showing that Marxist, feminist, psychoanalytic critiques, etc 'hinder' film studies. For example much Marxist film critique has very little to do with Karl Marx's application of Hegelian historical method. It has to do with the critique of class structures and consumption. How using Marxist critique in analyzing to understand someone like Eisenstein or Pasolini and feminist critique to understand Ackerman would be anything but productive is beyond me. And these are just the obvious examples. Similarly, Lacanian psychoanalytic critiques, while convoluted and and difficult are essentially concerned with power relations and identity, and it is a rare film that does not touch on these issues.

[Shrew]

The problem with Marxist critique is that, as bam points out, the problematic view of history as a linear progressive course of events (with hunter-gatherers eventually becoming tribes into "heroic" into feudal-agrarian societies into city-based industrialists into socialism) is still very much alive with Marxist academic circles. Lots of the really useful tools developed my Marxist critics (Gramsci and Hegemony, Althusser and Ideology, etc.) were essentially born out of the need to explain why capitalism hadn't collapsed yet.

The result is that, while I think there's a need and valid place for class-based readings of text, there's not a lot of options that aren't tainted with the concept of linear development and the inevitability of class revolution (at least not academic readings). Eventually, I hope there'll be more class-readings that can break away from Marxism (or at least its problematic parts).

As for theory in general, I find it interesting, because when used in conjunction with close reading, it can open up a text in fascinating new ways and connect it to general trends in culture. The trouble is that there's an extreme danger of that reading becoming the only lens through which people view a work, which in turn really diminishes the art.

[Satori]

The problem with Marxist critique is that, as bam points out, the problematic view of history as a linear progressive course of events (with hunter-gatherers eventually becoming tribes into "heroic" into feudal-agrarian societies into city-based industrialists into socialism) is still very much alive with Marxist academic circles.

The teleological narrative of history you are describing here sounds like what is popularly called "vulgar marxism," which has been very much discredited in academic Marxist circles. The problem with vulgar marxism is the essentially its insistence on an economic determinism- that each of these modes of production will invariably give way to the next one in a very specific way. Raymond Williams offers a blistering critique of economic determinism, base/superstructure, and so on in Marxism and Literature, a classic text of the Marxist new left that is still widely read and cited.

Lots of the really useful tools developed my Marxist critics (Gramsci and Hegemony, Althusser and Ideology, etc.) were essentially born out of the need to explain why capitalism hadn't collapsed yet.

Well, i suppose (although I think Gramsci was more interested in the problem of fascism), but I think this actually suggests the power of the Marxist problematic to generate new frameworks and theories in the face of new historical developments rather than its tendency to stubbornly insist on its orthodoxy.

The trouble is that there's an extreme danger of that reading becoming the only lens through which people view a work, which in turn really diminishes the art.

I agree 100%, but I think that this holds true for any critical methodology, not just Marxism. Marxism is really good at asking certain questions that are useful when interpreting a text, but it invariably leaves blindspots. This is why Marxist-feminism, certain strands of post-colonialism influenced by Marxism (Spivak especially), and, more recently, queer Marxism, have come about.

[Mr Sausage]

I think the main flaw with reading art through "-isms" is that it tends to lead to reductionism or circular, reflexive explanations (with certain theorists it seems more that art is being used to explain their theories than the other way around). Applying one -ism to counter the blindspots of another just seems to compound the problem. I like it when various theories supply the right questions, but not so much when they claim to have all the answers, which many do. It's of a piece with the economist who interprets everything through economics, or the cognitive behaviourist who interprets everything through behaviourism: people looking through a microscope and claiming to see the whole world. Fewer things have their explanations in theory than theory would have you believe.

All critical methodologies have limits, but some seem more limited than others. The methodologies bolstered by currently fashionable political ideologies might just end up having a shorter applicability than some others. As history continues forward, I think a lot of theory will fade away and what'll remain will be certain individual critics--of whatever school--whose continued existence will be for reasons other than the ones they thought would assure their posterity.

[Satori]

(with certain theorists it seems more that art is being used to explain their theories than the other way around)

Oh, absolutely. And I think many would admit that the art functions as textual raw material for exploring the ideological questions they are interested in. Not all theory does this, of course, but I think some theorists are without a doubt more interested in exploring political issues than arriving at the best reading of a particular work of art. One thing that art does is to reflect the way in which various ideological positions are framed within a culture and this can be of tremendous use for someone interested in exploring, say, representations of class or gays and lesbians within a specific historical moment. I don't think this is inherently a problem as long as the critic is upfront about this, though. It seems to me to be a question of priorities: while some critics want to produce a thorough, deep reading of a work of art for its own sake, others want to use that piece of art to understand a political question that might be only tangentially related to some of the work's dominant themes. For me, both methods are equally valid. I admit that I am more interested in politics than art, but I've never had any patience for critics who, for instance, accuse all formalists of being ideological dupes, ect. I think there is plenty of room for all kinds of criticism.

I like it when various theories supply the right questions, but not so much when they claim to have all the answers, which many do. It's of a piece with the economist who interprets everything through economics, or the cognitive behaviourist who interprets everything through behaviourism: people looking through a microscope and claiming to see the whole world.

I'd agree with this, too. For me, the key might is to bring a certain humility to what the theory can do. Instead of claiming to see the whole world in the microscope, or, in the case of criticism, the whole of the text in the theory, the key is to know going in that you can only see a very specific thing when using that theory. I always tell my students that theories are like different pairs of glasses that allow you to see a very specific set of things within a text, never the whole text. A Marxist reading might give you insight into class dynamics, something that you might not otherwise have teased out of the text. While this is certainly an incomplete picture of the text, it's still might be useful (especially if your goal is simply to understand how class dynamics are framed within a certain subset of cultural production). Sometimes a Marxist reading might even be useful even if you don't have a particular commitment to the ideology, but just want to understand the work of art itself (like, say, in the case of Weekend).

Applying one -ism to counter the blindspots of another just seems to compound the problem

You are certainly never able to see the whole text regardless of how many theoretical frameworks you apply. But i think a reading that utilizes multiple frameworks can be helpful in understanding the interconnectedness of various ideological problems in a text or how they mediate each other. For instance, how heteronormativity and capitalism reinforce each other through the figure of the nuclear family in Spielberg or something. Utilizing multiple theories also helps counter the notion that any of them have the "correct" or "best" answer.

[Mr Sausage]

Oh, absolutely. And I think many would admit that the art functions as textual raw material for exploring the ideological questions they are interested in. Not all theory does this, of course, but I think some theorists are without a doubt more interested in exploring political issues than arriving at the best reading of a particular work of art. One thing that art does is to reflect the way in which various ideological positions are framed within a culture and this can be of tremendous use for someone interested in exploring, say, representations of class or gays and lesbians within a specific historical moment. I don't think this is inherently a problem as long as the critic is upfront about this, though. It seems to me to be a question of priorities: while some critics want to produce a thorough, deep reading of a work of art for its own sake, others want to use that piece of art to understand a political question that might be only tangentially related to some of the work's dominant themes. For me, both methods are equally valid. I admit that I am more interested in politics than art, but I've never had any patience for critics who, for instance, accuse all formalists of being ideological dupes, ect. I think there is plenty of room for all kinds of criticism.

You seem to've misunderstood me, and that's probably my fault. I didn't mean a theorist who uses texts in order to probe some wider aspect of culture. I meant a theorist who uses textual and cultural material simply to justify his own theories. There are certain theorists whose ultimate concern seems to be the confirmation of their own positions. It's a process that spirals in on itself.

You are certainly never able to see the whole text regardless of how many theoretical frameworks you apply. But i think a reading that utilizes multiple frameworks can be helpful in understanding the interconnectedness of various ideological problems in a text or how they mediate each other. For instance, how heteronormativity and capitalism reinforce each other through the figure of the nuclear family in Spielberg or something. Utilizing multiple theories also helps counter the notion that any of them have the "correct" or "best" answer.

I'm all for synthesizing the more interesting ideas in various theories. I'm less convinced by piling their frameworks upon each other. Put enough lenses in front of your face and you end up not seeing anything beyond them. There's also the problem of control: what is controlling this theoretical compounding? It seems like one can just compound various theories on a whim. Maybe the combination is revelatory, maybe it's distorting. It's the distortions that bother me, especially the ones done in the name of the specific ideology of the theorist.

I suppose I'm more amenable to an approach that understands ideology without needing to adopt various ideological lenses to generate readings. (I should say I generally appreciate Marxist and feminist approaches and that my posts here have had other theories in mind).

[Satori]

You seem to've misunderstood me, and that's probably my fault. I didn't mean a theorist who uses texts in order to probe some wider aspect of culture. I meant a theorist who uses textual and cultural material simply to justify his own theories. There are certain theorists whose ultimate concern seems to be the confirmation of their own positions. It's a process that spirals in on itself.

Ah, my mistake. I suspect a lot of the reason theorists seem to do this is because they are trying to defend their method against some other competing one by showing that it is validated by some recent trend in culture. I suppose I kind of understand why they would want to do this (dwindling academic publishing market and all), but you're right that it tends to be counterproductive and create circular arguments. But I do think (hope?) that this can be overcome by always remaining critical of your own methodology.

There's also the problem of control: what is controlling this theoretical compounding? It seems like one can just compound various theories on a whim. Maybe the combination is revelatory, maybe it's distorting. It's the distortions that bother me, especially the ones done in the name of the specific ideology of the theorist.

There is probably some arbitrariness in theoretical combinations due to the training the critic has had (my own training is largely in Marxism and gender/queer studies, so I tend to be interested in questions that intersect those fields) or, sad as it might be, what is currently "hot" in the academic journals and so on. Ideally, though, these compoundings would happen organically because of what is going on in the text or where your reading takes you. I agree there is nothing worse that trying to jam a text into a specific combination of theoretical frameworks when it won't fit (it's like the academic version of some of those Shining moon landing theories). I just find some theoretical approaches to be indispensable when thinking about certain issues in films or literature, so I tend to ask questions that will lead me in those directions. I'm sure that it leads to blindspots in my own readings, but my hope is that someone else can bring up the issues I might have missed and I might be able to find something new, at least every now and again.

[bamwc2]

In a happy coincidence, one of my new colleagues is a Heideggerian who told me that he's a fan of Walter Benjamin's (I brought up this conversation over lunch). He promised to help me through an independent reading of his work this next school year.